LATEST DECISIONS
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- 2024Hun-Na8
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Final decision : upheld (removed from office)
Decision date : Apr 04, 2025 -
Decision Announcement
The Court will now deliver its decision in Case No. 2024Hun-Na8, involving the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol.
▣ First, the Court will address the justiciability requirements.
(1) The Court will assess whether the declaration of the martial law in this case is subject to judicial review.
In light of, inter alia, the purpose of impeachment trials―which is to protect the constitutional order from violations of the Constitution and statutes by high-ranking public officials―the declaration of the martial law in this case is subject to review of both its constitutionality and statutory legality even if it involved a highly political determination.
(2) The Court will assess the National Assembly’s approval of the impeachment resolution in this case despite the absence of an investigation by the Legislation and Judiciary Committee.
The Constitution entrusts the impeachment procedure of the National Assembly to legislation, and the National Assembly Act provides that whether to conduct an investigation through the Legislation and Judiciary Committee lies within the Assembly’s discretion. Therefore, the absence of such an investigation does not render the approval of the impeachment resolution procedurally improper.
(3) The Court will assess whether the approval of the impeachment resolution in this case violated the rule against reproposal or reintroduction of the same question during the same session.
The National Assembly Act provides that a question that is rejected shall not be proposed again during the same session. Although the first impeachment resolution against Respondent failed to reach a vote during the 418th regular session, the impeachment resolution in this case was introduced during the 419th extraordinary session. Thus, it does not violate the rule against reproposal or reintroduction of the same question during the same session.
Regarding this matter, Justice Cheong Hyungsik filed a concurring opinion, expressing the view that legislation is needed to limit the number of times an impeachment resolution may be introduced even across different sessions.
(4) The Court will assess whether a justiciable interest is lacking because the martial law in this case was lifted shortly after its imposition and caused no harm.
Even though the martial law in this case was lifted, the grounds for impeachment had already arisen due to its imposition. Therefore, the existence of a justiciable interest cannot be denied.
(5) The Court will assess the change in the legal characterization of the alleged acts after the filing of the impeachment petition-from violations of the Criminal Act to breaches of the Constitution.
Where the underlying facts remain unchanged, withdrawing or changing the legal provisions applied does not constitute a withdrawal or change in the grounds for impeachment and is therefore permitted without the need for any special procedure.
Respondent argues that, had the charges related to insurrection not been included in the original grounds for impeachment, the quorum for the impeachment vote would not have been met. However, this argument is purely hypothetical and is not objectively supported by any evidence.
(6) The Court will assess the claim that the power to adopt the impeachment resolution was abused for the purpose of usurping the presidency.
Since the approval of the impeachment resolution in this case was procedurally lawful, and the constitutional or statutory violations by Respondent have been demonstrated to a certain degree, the Court cannot find that the power to adopt the impeachment resolution was abused.
Accordingly, the impeachment petition in this case is justiciable.
Regarding a rule of evidence, Justices Lee Mison and Kim Hyungdu filed a concurring opinion, expressing the view that the hearsay rule under the Criminal Procedure Act may be relaxed in impeachment trials. Justices Kim Bok-hyeong and Cho Hanchang filed a concurring opinion, expressing the view that the hearsay rule should be applied more strictly in future impeachment trials.
▣ Next, the Court will address whether Respondent violated the Constitution or statutes in the course of performing his official duties, and whether such violations were sufficiently grave to justify removal from office.
The Court will begin by reviewing each ground for impeachment individually.
(1) The Court will assess the declaration of the martial law in this case.
● According to the Constitution and the Martial Law Act, one of the substantive requirements for declaring emergency martial law is the actual occurrence of belligerency or extreme disturbances of social order that considerably impede the performance of the administrative and judicial functions of the State in time of war, armed riot or other equivalent national emergency.
Respondent argues that a grave crisis of this nature arose due to the tyranny of the opposition-led National Assembly, in which the opposition party, holding a majority of seats, pursued impeachment in an unprecedented manner, unilaterally exercised its legislative powers, and attempted to cut the government budget.
After Respondent took office and prior to the declaration of martial law in this case, the National Assembly introduced a total of 22 impeachment resolutions against various public officials, including the Minister of the Interior and Safety, prosecutors, the chairperson of the Korea Communications Commission, and the chairperson of the Board of Audit and Inspection. These actions have raised concerns that the National Assembly, without sufficient deliberation on the constitutional or statutory validity of the grounds for impeachment, employed the impeachment proceedings as a political instrument to pressure the government, relying merely on suspicions of legal violations.
However, at the time the martial law in this case was declared, only two impeachment trials were underway―one against a single prosecutor and another against the chairperson of the Korea Communications Commission.
As for the bills that Respondent claimed had been unilaterally passed by the opposition party and were therefore problematic, their legal effect had not yet come into force, as Respondent had either requested reconsideration or withheld their promulgation.
The 2025 budget proposal could not have had any impact on the situation at the time of the declaration of the martial law in this case, when the 2024 budget was still in effect. Moreover, this budget proposal had merely passed the National Assembly’s Special Committee on Budget and Accounts and had not yet been approved by a plenary session of the National Assembly.
Therefore, the Court cannot find that the exercise of the National Assembly’s powers―such as impeachment, legislation, or deliberation on a budget proposal―created any actual crisis at the time the martial law in this case was declared.
Even if the exercise of the National Assembly’s authority was unlawful or unjust, such matters could have been addressed through the ordinary exercise of powers―such as the Constitutional Court’s impeachment trial or Respondent’s request for reconsideration of bills. Therefore, the exercise of national emergency powers cannot be justified.
Respondent also contends that he declared the martial law in this case to dispel suspicions of electoral fraud. However, the mere existence of such suspicions is not sufficient to establish that a grave crisis situation had actually occurred. Additionally, the National Election Commission announced that it had addressed most of the security vulnerabilities prior to the 22nd National Assembly election, and that it had implemented, inter alia, the following two measures: 24-hour public access to CCTV footage of the storage locations for early voting and mail-in ballot boxes, and a manual ballot verification system for the ballot counting process. These measures further invalidate Respondent’s claim.
In sum, even when considering all of the circumstances alleged by Respondent, the Court cannot find that a crisis of such severity existed at the time of the declaration of the martial law in this case as to objectively justify Respondent’s judgment.
The Constitution and the Martial Law Act provide, as substantive conditions for the declaration of emergency martial law, that the mobilization of military forces be required to cope with a military necessity or to maintain public safety and order.
However, the governmental paralysis caused by the exercise of the National Assembly's powers and the suspicions of electoral fraud, both asserted by Respondent, are matters that must be addressed through political, institutional, or judicial means―not through the mobilization of military forces.
Respondent claims that the martial law in this case was intended to serve as a “warning-type” or “appeal-type” martial law to inform citizens of the opposition party’s tyranny and the national crisis. However, such a purpose is not one prescribed by the Martial Law Act for the declaration of martial law.
Additionally, Respondent did not merely stop at declaring martial law, but went so far as to violate the Constitution and statutes by mobilizing the military and police to interfere with the National Assembly’s exercise of its powers. Therefore, Respondent’s claim that the martial law was merely a warning or an appeal cannot be accepted.
Accordingly, the declaration of the martial law in this case violated the substantive requirements for the declaration of emergency martial law.
● Next, the Court will assess whether the declaration of the martial law in this case complied with the procedural requirements.
The declaration of martial law and the appointment of a martial law commander must undergo deliberation by the State Council.
It is acknowledged that, prior to declaring the martial law in this case, Respondent briefly explained the purpose of the declaration to the Prime Minister and nine members of the State Council.
However, given, inter alia, that Respondent did not explain the specific details of the martial law, such as the appointment of a martial law commander, and did not provide other members with the opportunity to express their views, it is difficult to conclude that the deliberation on the declaration of the martial law in this case took place.
Moreover, Respondent proceeded to declare the martial law in this case despite the Prime Minister and relevant State Council members not affixing their signatures to the emergency martial law declaration. Additionally, the date, time, and areas of its enforcement and the identity of the martial law commander were not announced. Nor was the National Assembly notified of the declaration without delay. Therefore, Respondent violated the procedural requirements for declaring emergency martial law as set forth in the Constitution and the Martial Law Act.
(2) The Court will assess the deployment of military and police forces to the National Assembly.
Respondent directed the Minister of National Defense to deploy the military to the National Assembly. In response, soldiers entered the premises of the National Assembly using helicopters and other means, and in some cases, broke windows to gain entry into the main building. Respondent also issued instructions to the Commander of the Army Special Warfare Command and others, stating, “It seems the quorum has not been met, so break down the doors and pull out the people inside,” along with other orders. Additionally, through the martial law commander, Respondent conveyed the contents of the martial law command proclamation in this case to the Chief of the National Police Agency and personally made six phone calls to him. In response, the Chief of the National Police Agency ordered a complete blockade of access to the National Assembly. Consequently, some of the National Assembly members who were converging on the National Assembly had to climb over the fences or were unable to enter at all.
Moreover, the Minister of National Defense directed the Commander of the Defense Counterintelligence Command to locate 14 individuals―including the Speaker of the National Assembly and the leaders of political parties―for the purpose of arresting them if necessary. Respondent called the First Deputy Director of the National Intelligence Service and told him to support the Defense Counterintelligence Command. The Commander of the Defense Counterintelligence Command asked the First Deputy Director to assist in locating those individuals.
By deploying military and police forces to restrict National Assembly members’ access to the Assembly and ordering that they be pulled out, Respondent interfered with the exercise of the Assembly’s powers. As a result, Respondent violated the constitutional provision that grants the Assembly the authority to request the lifting of martial law and infringed its members’ authority to deliberate and vote and their immunity from arrest. Further, by participating in the attempt to track the whereabouts of political party leaders and others, Respondent infringed freedom of political party activities.
By deploying troops for political purposes, including obstructing the National Assembly’s exercise of its authority, Respondent placed soldiers―who have faithfully served the nation with the missions of maintaining national security and defending the land―in confrontation with ordinary citizens. As a result, Respondent infringed the duty of the Armed Forces to maintain political neutrality and breached his constitutional obligation as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
(3) The Court will assess the issuance of the martial law command proclamation in this case.
Respondent, through the martial law command proclamation in this case, banned the activities of the National Assembly, local legislative bodies, and political parties. As a result, Respondent violated, inter alia, the constitutional provision granting the National Assembly the authority to request the lifting of martial law, the constitutional provision establishing the political party system, and the principles of representative democracy and separation of powers. Respondent also violated the constitutional and Martial Law Act provisions that set forth the requirements for restricting fundamental rights under emergency martial law and violated the warrant requirement. As a result, Respondent infringed, inter alia, citizens’ fundamental political rights, their right to collective action, and their freedom of occupation.
(4) The Court will assess the search and seizure conducted against the National Election Commission.
Respondent directed the Minister of National Defense to deploy military personnel to inspect the computer systems of election commissions. In response, military personnel were dispatched to the buildings of the National Election Commission, where they restricted access, confiscated the duty officers’ mobile phones, and took photographs of the computer systems. These actions constitute a warrantless search and seizure of election commissions, thereby violating the warrant requirement and infringing the independence of election commissions.
(5) The Court will assess the attempt to track the whereabouts of members of the legal profession.
As previously stated, Respondent was involved in attempts to determine the locations of individuals for the purpose of arrest if deemed necessary. Among the targets were a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who had recently retired, and a former Justice of the Supreme Court. Such conduct places pressure on sitting judges by creating the perception that they, too, could at any time become subjects of arrest by the executive branch. Therefore, it constitutes an infringement upon the independence of the judiciary.
The Court will now assess whether Respondent’s violations of law, as examined thus far, are of sufficient gravity to justify his removal from office.
To resolve the confrontation with the National Assembly, Respondent declared martial law and, by deploying military and police forces, interfered with the constitutional exercise of the National Assembly's powers, thus undermining the principles of popular sovereignty and democracy. Among other actions, by sending troops to conduct a search and seizure against the National Election Commission, Respondent disregarded the constitutional structure of governance. Further, by issuing the martial law command proclamation in this case, Respondent extensively violated the fundamental rights of citizens.
These actions, in and of themselves, violated the State’s fundamental principles of the rule of law and democracy, undermining the constitutional order, and seriously endangering the stability of the democratic republic.
The fact that the National Assembly was able to quickly pass a resolution calling for the lifting of martial law was due to the resistance of citizens and the passive conduct of the military and police forces. Therefore, this does not alter the assessment of the gravity of Respondent’s legal violations.
The powers of the President are granted solely by the Constitution. However, by exercising the State’s emergency powers―powers that must be used with the utmost caution―beyond the constitutional limits, Respondent caused a loss of public trust in the exercise of presidential authority.
Since Respondent’s inauguration, the exercise of authority by several high-ranking public officials has been suspended during impeachment trials due to an unprecedented number of impeachments led by the opposition party. Regarding the 2025 budget proposal, for the first time in constitutional history, the National Assembly’s Special Committee on Budget and Accounts passed a reduction with no increases, solely by the vote of the opposition party. The major policies established by Respondent could not be implemented due to resistance from the opposition party. Furthermore, the opposition party unilaterally passed bills despite the government's objections, leading to repeated requests for reconsideration by Respondent and repeated votes in the National Assembly.
In the course of these events, Respondent likely perceived that the government was becoming paralyzed and that the national interest was being severely undermined due to the tyranny of the opposition party. As a result, Respondent likely felt a profound responsibility to find a way to overcome the situation.
Respondent’s view that the National Assembly’s exercise of power constituted an abuse of authority or caused governmental paralysis is a political judgment that deserves respect. However, the conflict between Respondent and the National Assembly cannot be attributed solely to one side. It is a political issue that must be resolved in accordance with democratic principles. Any expression of political opinion or public decision-making on this matter must occur within the bounds of democracy as guaranteed by the Constitution.
The National Assembly should have endeavored to reach a conclusion through dialogue and compromise, demonstrating respect for minority opinions and a spirit of tolerance and restraint in its relationship with the government. Similarly, Respondent should have respected the National Assembly as an equal partner in governance, as it represents the people. Nevertheless, Respondent excluded the National Assembly - an action that undermines the foundations of democratic politics and is difficult to reconcile with democracy.
Even when Respondent regarded the National Assembly’s exercise of power as the tyranny of the majority, he should have relied on the remedies envisioned by the Constitution to ensure checks and balances.
Approximately two years after taking office, Respondent had the opportunity to persuade citizens to support his leadership in the National Assembly elections. Even when the outcome did not align with his intention, he should not have attempted to disregard the will of the people who supported the opposition party.
Nevertheless, by declaring the martial law in this case in violation of the Constitution and statutes, Respondent recreated a history of the State’s abuse of emergency powers, shocking citizens, and causing confusion across all sectors―social, economic, political, and diplomatic.
He failed in his responsibility and duty, as the President of all citizens, to look beyond his supporters and to unify the broader social community.
By mobilizing the military and police, he undermined the authority of constitutional institutions, such as the National Assembly, and infringed the fundamental rights of citizens. As a result, he abandoned his responsibility and duty to safeguard the Constitution, gravely betraying the trust of the Korean people―the sovereigns of this democratic republic.
In conclusion, Respondent’s acts of violating the Constitution and statutes represent a betrayal of the people’s trust and constitute grave violations of the law that are unpardonable from the standpoint of protecting the Constitution.
Since the negative impact and influence on the constitutional order caused by Respondent’s violations of the law are serious, the Court believes that the benefits of protecting the Constitution by removing Respondent from office overwhelmingly outweigh the national loss that would result from the removal of the President.
Accordingly, the Court, in a unanimous decision, issues its holding.
As this is an impeachment case, I will confirm the time of the issuance. The current time is 11:22 a.m.
Holding: Respondent, President Yoon Suk-yeol, is removed from office.
This concludes the announcement.
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- 2024Hun-Ka12, 2024Hun-Ba287 (consolidated)
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Final decision : nonconforming to the Constitution
Decision date : Apr 10, 2025 -
On April 10, 2025, the Court, in a unanimous decision of all eight Justices who participated in the deliberation, issued the following rulings on the order of priority for receiving monetary compensation among the surviving children of a deceased person of distinguished service to the State.
1. The Court dismissed as nonjusticiable a claim challenging the portion of Article 13, Section (2), Item 1 of the Act on the Honorable Treatment of and Support for Persons, etc. of Distinguished Service to the State (amended by Act No. 16659 on November 26, 2019) that grants priority to one of the surviving children through consultation among them. Under this provision, if one child is designated through such consultation, that child is given priority.
2. The Court held constitutional the portion of Item 2 of the same Section that grants priority to a surviving child who mainly supported the deceased person of distinguished service to the State over the other surviving children. Under this provision, such child is given priority in the absence of a surviving child designated through consultation.
3. The Court held nonconforming to the Constitution the portion of the first clause of the first sentence of Item 3 of the same Section that grants priority to the oldest among the surviving children. Under this provision, such child is given priority in the absence of a surviving child who is designated through consultation or who mainly supported the deceased person of distinguished service to the State. The Court also ordered that the provision remain in effect until amended by December 31, 2026.
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- 2024Hun-Na9
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Final decision : rejected
Decision date : Mar 24, 2025 -
On March 24, 2025, the Court rejected an impeachment petition filed against Prime Minister Han Duck-soo.
Regarding the justiciability requirements, the Court observed that, under the main clause of Article 65, Section (2) of the Constitution, the voting requirement for impeaching Respondent while serving as Acting President is the same as that for impeaching him in his original capacity as Prime Minister―namely, approval by a majority of the total members of the National Assembly. Therefore, the Court found the instant impeachment petition justiciable.
On the merits, four Justices (Justices Moon Hyungbae, Lee Mison, Kim Hyungdu, and Jung Jungmi) filed an opinion rejecting the impeachment petition. They stated that the impeachment grounds concerning 1) the exercise of the authority to request reconsideration of the bill on the appointment of a special prosecutor, 2) the declaration of martial law and the act of insurrection, 3) joint governance, and 4) the request for recommendation of special prosecutor candidates did not amount to a constitutional or statutory violation by Respondent. Although Respondent’s failure to appoint Justices of the Constitutional Court was found to violate, inter alia, Articles 66 and 111 of the Constitution and Article 56 of the State Public Officials Act, the Justices noted that such violations could not be deemed a betrayal of the public trust indirectly vested in Respondent through the President as the appointing authority, and therefore did not constitute grounds sufficient to justify removal from office.
One Justice (Justice Kim Bok-hyeong) filed an opinion rejecting the impeachment petition, expressing the view that Respondent’s failure to appoint Justices of the Constitutional Court does not constitute a constitutional or statutory violation as well.
One Justice (Justice Chung Kyesun) filed an opinion upholding the impeachment petition, expressing the view that Respondent violated the Constitution and statutes with respect to both the request for recommendation of special prosecutor candidates and the failure to appoint Justices of the Constitutional Court, and that the gravity of such violations was sufficient to justify removal from office.
Justices Cheong Hyungsik and Cho Hanchang filed an opinion dismissing the impeachment petition, expressing the view that it was nonjusticiable because the impeachment resolution failed to meet the voting threshold for passage under the proviso of Article 65, Section (2) of the Constitution, which requires approval by at least two-thirds of the total members of the National Assembly when the Prime Minister is serving as Acting President.
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